Saturday, October 4, 2008

Rep. Joe Pitts explains vote against "Bail Out"

The following communication was sent by U.S. Representative Joe Pitts. It can be found in its entirety here


TO: Citizens of the 16th Congressional District of Pennsylvania

FROM: Congressman Joe Pitts

DATE: Friday, October 3, 2008

RE: H.R. 1424, The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008

Today I voted against The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act because I felt it attempted to do the right thing the wrong way. America is facing a credit crisis. It needed to be addressed quickly and well. Congress has acted quickly, but it has not acted well.

This crisis began in 1995 when the government began pressuring lenders to give mortgages to high-risk borrowers in order to increase homeownership in America . This created a new market for lenders who soon rushed to make as much money as possible by inducing people who could only afford small houses to buy large ones instead. In other words, this crisis began with the government botching an attempt to do something good. It should not have ended that way as well.

This week, Congress had an opportunity to try again to do this correctly. Instead, the Senate sent the House a bill full of tax breaks for special interests, unrelated provisions, and only minor improvements. Instead of earning more votes by improving the bill, the Senate bill bought votes by adding “sweeteners.”

The crisis we are facing is real. However, in this country I believe market problems should be addressed with market-based solutions. This bill is a big-government approach that increases the federal debt limit to $11.3 trillion, in order to create a quick fix. It gives unprecedented power to the federal bureaucracy. There are no reforms in this bill to correct the mistakes that caused this crisis. It does not address the basic problem. It does not adequately protect the taxpayer.

I and a great number of my colleagues advocated for a plan focused on market-based asset insurance, changes to the tax code, regulatory reform, and protections for homeowners and taxpayers. Unfortunately, our advice was not taken.

The bill does increase FDIC insurance limits, which should help. The Securities and Exchange Commission is reportedly also planning to alter the much-discussed “mark-to-market” accounting rules. That will also help. The bill passed today will probably have the desired effect of encouraging markets and removing “toxic” assets that are “clogging” credit markets. American workers and American businesses are the best in the world. We will make it through this crisis, and we will return to prosperity.

I do want you to know, however, what I and so many colleagues in Congress would have done if we had had the chance to offer an alternative for a vote in Congress. Following is a summary of provisions our alternative would have contained. I will continue to advocate for these actions and reforms.

Representing you in Congress is a tremendous honor. It is also many times a tremendous challenge. The economic problems we face today are complex and difficult. Two thousand of you reached out to me over the last week to let me know what you thought. While calls came in on both sides of the issue, the overwhelming majority of you opposed this legislation. Regardless of your position, I was gratified to hear from so many of you. The principled arguments you made encouraged me and reminded me of the fundamental wisdom of our system of government. Democracy works.

What the Government Should Do

1. Create an Insurance Program

Instead of buying assets, the Treasury should insure the bad assets of banks and investors by:

1. Stabilizing Financial Markets: Require that the Department of Treasury to create an insurance program to guarantee losses up to 100 percent, resulting from the failure of timely payment and interest from mortgage-backed securities (MBS) originated prior to the date of enactment. Such insurance would provide immediate value to the securities and a foundation for which they could then be sold.

2. Creating Risk-Based Premiums: Direct the Treasury Department to assess a premium on outstanding MBS to finance this insurance program. Participation in the program would be mandatory for all holders of such MBS in order to guard against adverse selection where only the holders of troubled assets participate. A risk-based premium would be assessed on those with troubled MBS to ensure those who have acted irresponsibly have to pay more than those who have acted responsibly. The premium would expire when the Treasury Secretary determines the fund has sufficient resources to meet any projected losses.

3. Currently the federal government insures approximately half of all mortgage backed securities (MBS). We can insure the rest of current outstanding MBS; however, rather than taxpayers funding insurance, the holders of these assets should pay for it. The Treasury Department can design a system to charge premiums to the holders of MBS to fully finance this insurance.

2. Create a Loan Program

Congress should work with the President, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to set up an additional loan program for failing financial institutions that would:

  1. Grant the Fed the authority to lend to financial institutions: The Fed currently has $400 billion in cash that they could inject into the market place. This money could be infused into the market immediately and would allow banks to free up existing capital.
  2. Reform FDIC Regulations: Congress should authorize the FDIC to backstop the Fed’s loans by ensuring more capital. Additional FDIC insurance would shore up confidence in banks and keep people from losing their savings.
  3. Keep the Federal Government out of the market: Fed loans to failing financial institutions should be backed by sell-only stock warrants. Backing government loans with sell-only stock warrants will be allow the government to recoup its investment and prevent it from controlling a private institution.
  4. When the government stepped in to rescue AIG, the government made a loan at an interest rate similar to what most people pay on their credit cards. The government also received sell-only stock warrants as collateral for their loan. In this arrangement, AIG is able to continue meeting the needs of the market place while the government is in a strong position to recoup its investment. Additionally, bureaucrats in Washington will not be able to control AIG because of their sell-only stock warrant arrangement.

3. Restructure the Tax Code

Congress should act immediately to increase private capital in the marketplace by reducing taxes to critical sectors of the economy:

  1. Two-Year Suspension of the Capital Gains Tax: Immediately suspend the capital gains rate from 15 for percent individuals and 35 percent for corporations. By encouraging corporations to sell unwanted assets, this provision would unleash funds and materials with which to create jobs and grow the economy. After the two-year suspension, capital gains rates would return to present levels but assets would be indexed permanently for any inflationary gains.
  2. Net Operating Losses: Allow companies to carry-back losses arising in tax years ending in 2007, 2008, or 2009 back 5 years, generating a tax refund and immediate capital. Despite the presence of willing buyers, many firms with MBS are not willing to sell at such a huge loss. This carry-back would provide cushion for any such loss, making firms more willing sellers.
  3. Repatriation Infusion: Allow a repatriation window for profits earned by U.S. firms overseas. Such repatriation amounts would be taxed at 0 percent if invested in distressed debt (as defined by Treasury) for at least one year.
  4. Bank Losses on GSE Stock: Allow banks to treat losses on shares of preferred stock in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as ordinary losses, not as capital losses.
  5. Instead of injecting taxpayer capital into the market to produce liquidity, private capital can be drawn into the market by removing regulatory and tax barriers that are currently blocking private capital formation. Too much private capital is sitting on the sidelines during this crisis.

4. Reform Market Regulations

The SEC and Congress should immediately act to increase Transparency, Oversight, and Market Reform by:

1. Limiting Executive Compensation: Require the Treasury to write rules prohibiting excessive compensation or golden parachutes to executives of failed companies at the expense of taxpayers.

2. Reforming the Credit Rating Agencies: Call on the SEC to review the performance of the Credit Rating Agencies and their ability to accurately reflect the risks of these failed investment securities.

3. Modifying Fair Value Accounting (Eliminate Mark-to-Market Rule): Fair Value Accounting dictates that financial institutions holding financial instruments available for sale (such as mortgage-backed securities) must mark those assets to market. Currently, there is no meaningful market for mortgage backed securities. Asset value should not be assessed at unrealistic fire-sale prices. Regulators must evaluate the assets on the basis of their true economic value. The SEC should exercise its immediate ability to suspend fair value accounting standards as applied to mortgage backed securities. The mark-to-market rule can be suspended for six months and then replaced with a more accurate three year rolling average mark-to-market.

4. Repealing Sarbanes-Oxley: Sarbanes-Oxley failed with Freddy Mac. It failed with Fannie Mae. It failed with Bear Stearns. It failed with Lehman Brothers. It failed with AIG. It is crippling our entrepreneurial economy. Many more firms would be able to go public if the law was repealed. It is Sarbanes-Oxley’s $3 million per startup annual accounting fee that is keeping these companies private.

5. Ending “Naked” Short Selling: In recent years the SEC has lifted restraints on short sellers of stock to allow “naked selling” (when a broker does not in fact borrow shares to deliver to the buyer) and to eliminate the requirement that short sellers could sell only on an uptick in the market. The SEC has temporarily restricted short sells on financial stocks. To prevent artificial price volatility, there should be no naked short sales and short sales should only take place when there are upticks in the market.

6. Creating a Blue Ribbon Panel: A blue ribbon panel with representatives of Treasury, SEC, and the Fed should make recommendations to Congress for reforms of the financial sector by January 1, 2009. (This has in large part, already been accomplished by Treasury, which produced the “Department of Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure” in the spring of 2008. We should take its suggestions seriously)

7. Reforming GSEs: Since Congress chartered Freddie Mae in 1938 and Freddie Mac in 1970, these two Government-Sponsored Enterprises have consumed a lion’s share of the market, undermining the housing market and jeopardizing the economy. Congress must learn from its mistakes by reforming these GSEs and limiting Federal exposure to high risk loans. Freddie and Fannie should never again be allowed to securitize the unsound mortgages created by the greed on Wall Street and poor policies in Washington .

8. Reforming CRA: In 1993 President Clinton advocated for changes to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). These proposals were adopted by 1997, and had the disastrous effect of encouraging lending agencies to offer irresponsible mortgages that people could not afford. Congress should reform CRA and stop encouraging irresponsible lending practices.

5. Helping Homeowners

Congress should implement measures to encourage responsible homeownership and decreased mortgage foreclosures:

1. Tax Credits: Congress should provide additional tax credits for purchasing homes.

2. Assistance to Homeowners: Provide assistance to homeowners who have been caught up in the current mortgage crisis and are trying to save their homes by extending the Cancellation of Mortgage Indebtedness Forgiveness. In a foreclosure proceeding or write-down of principal on a mortgage, the forgiven debt is considered taxable income. The “Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007,” P.L. 110-142, excludes debt forgiven before the end of 2009 from taxable income. The proposal extends this treatment for 3 years, through 2012. It does not extend the relief to home equity loans.

Contact:

Andrew Cole

Press Secretary

Rep. Joseph Pitts (PA-16)

202-225-2411

Friday, October 3, 2008

New Era "panic" for Bail Out Plan off target

...Certain market players agree that giving [Treasury Secretary] Paulson "$700 billion in small unmarked bills in a paper bag" as one BBC commentator referred to it may not be the best way to deal with the crisis. Friday’s Federal seizure and sale of Washington Mutual and Monday’s Fed brokered sale of Wachovia to Citigroup clearly demonstrates the Fed’s determination to ensure the orderly sale of failing banks in a manner that protects depositors and minimizes disruptions to financial markets.

By guaranteeing "toxic assets" only to the extent it is necessary to facilitate the sale of failing banks to ones with stronger balance sheets, i.e. on a case by case basis, the Fed can minimize the impact of what essentially amounts to a massive consolidation of the US banking industry on financial markets without turning the free market system on its head.

How desperate are the HMA-owned hospitals?

I am writing in response to the recent newspaper (Lancaster New Era, Sept. 30) article detailing the most recent resurrection attempt of the Health Management Associates (HMA) owned hospitals, Lancaster Regional Medical Center and Heart of Lancaster Regional Center.

I have pity for the most recent CEO George Miller as he is again attempting to portray both hospitals as viable healthcare facilities in this county. From recent NewsLanc and Steinman Family newspaper printing , I believe that between both hospitals, there have been over a dozen different CEOs since HMA bought both hospitals since 2002. That is an abysmal rate of CEO positioning at an average of 6 months of tenure per person. This is Lancaster County and we do not like change.

How can a patient trust in their choice of hospital if the CEO changes every six months? A hospital is lead by its CEO and with these frequent CEO changes, how can a patient or even a doctor decide that the best care available is at one of these HMA hospitals when there is (what seems like) a new regime and with new direction with each successive CEO change.

Case in point, it seems that the HMA hospitals forecast a new approach to healthcare for doctors, patients and the community every six to twelve months. I read the newspaper everyday as well as look at websites such as Newslanc.com the number of front-page re-definitions of the HMA hospitals has been boggling. Such marketing attempts as two years ago when an investment opportunity (partnership) to physicians only was coolly received by the medical community is one episode of the desperation of both of these hospitals to try to survive in this county where a top-50 hospital all ready exists -- Lancaster General Hospital.

Following this failed attempt to woo doctors into investing in the ho spitals, then there was the front-page article about the two hospitals merging into one with the Lititz based hospital being built out to over three hundred beds and the former Saint Joseph's Hospital being downsized to rehabilitation and outpatient services. Soon thereafter, this attempt to recurrent business at both HMA hospitals failed.

And now the recent new article states that, under Mr. Miller, both hospitals will exist separately and the former idea of merging services is no longer. And the craziest idea is that Mr. Miller thinks that Lancaster County physicians will actually invest in these hospitals now. Why would anyone (particularly an assumed intelligent doctor or at least the doctor’s financial advisor) invest with any HMA hospital?

By the most recent financial data available, Lancaster General Hospital was financially sound with a greater than 130 million dollar profit and the combined balance sheet for the two HMA hospitals barely broke even. On top of this readily available information, an intelligent investor would also look at the stock holdings of HMA to determine if such an investment would be sound. With a review of the business page or even Yahoo.com, it doesn’t take long to note that HMA stock has plummeted (even before the recent Wall Street woes of Lehman Brothers and AIG)...

Unlike our federal government which is opting to bail out the multiple banking firms for bad investment, maybe we (the citizens of Lancaster County) should just let the two HMA hospitals financially fail and finally await HMA to close their doors. Only after these imminent HMA failures can Lancaster General Hospital finally take over both facilities and finally provide the quality of care at both of these facilities that the long-tenured citizens recall was offered by Saint Joseph’s Hospital and Community Hospital of Lancaster -- many, many years before HMA [took over] these healthcare facilities and prompted the ruination of both.

Sen. Casey writes about the "Bail Out."

Editor's Note: Below is the form e-mail received in response to an inquiry about the "Bail Out" from Senator Bob Casey.

Casey states below "After purchasing these assets, the Department of Treasury will hold them until markets for them recover. Treasury would then plan to sell these assets for a profit, recouping most or all of the $700 billion for the benefit of taxpayers."

It is unclear whether the Treasury will purchase securities at current 'market value' in which case the Treasury should earn a large profit over time (Warren Buffett said he would be pleased to invest with the Treasury in such an arrangement) or whether they will be purchased at a far higher than market value as though they were still highily rated bonds, in which case the loss will only be mitigated over the terms as some are paid off. In that case the taxpayers instead of the security owners will take most of the loss.



Thank you for taking the time to contact me regarding the proposal to stabilize the economy and our financial infrastructure. I appreciate hearing from all Pennsylvanians about the issues that matter most to them.

On Wednesday, October 1, the Senate passed H.R. 1424, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, a bill that will stabilize our credit markets, protect retirement and pension savings, modify troubled loans and protect taxpayers from paying for Wall Street's mistakes. After careful consideration, I decided to vote for this legislation.

This is a time of great economic uncertainty in our Nation's history. For many families in Pennsylvania and throughout the country, the recession has been part of their lives for many months now. Just this week we learned that the unemployment rate in Pennsylvania went from 5.4% to 5.8% in the month of August and for some parts of the state it went up far more than half a percentage point. We also learned that in the month of August the foreclosure rate in Pennsylvania went up by more than 60% from the previous year. The job loss and foreclosure rates are indicators of the economic trauma that many families have felt in Pennsylvania and across America.

Like you, I am not happy with the current crisis, and I'm angry about the climate of deregulation and deference to Wall Street over the last eight years that got us into this mess. However, failing to act will not simply punish those who brought us to this situation; it will punish everyone.

The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) provides up to $700 billion to the Secretary of the Treasury to buy mortgages and other assets that are clogging the balance sheets of financial institutions and making it difficult for working families, small businesses and other companies to access credit. After purchasing these assets, the Department of Treasury will hold them until markets for them recover. Treasury would then plan to sell these assets for a profit, recouping most or all of the $700 billion for the benefit of taxpayers.

You should know that Congress has significantly improved the original proposal presented by the Bush administration. In the version passed by the Senate, executives will be held accountable for their past decisions through limitations on compensation, prohibitions against golden parachutes or excessive retirement packages, and requirements that unearned bonuses be returned. As improved by the Senate, the legislation also requires participating companies to provide warrants and other forms of equity so that taxpayers will share in the profits if the stock of these companies goes up as a result of Treasury Department intervention.

The EESA also contains several provisions directed at stemming the tide of mortgage foreclosures thereby keeping families in their homes and addressing the root cause which has led to a loss of investor confidence and the freezing of credit markets. It would require the Treasury Department, where possible, to modify troubled loans to help American families keep their homes. It would also expand the HOPE for Homeowners program and require other federal agencies to modify loans that they own or control.

To ensure that Treasury isn't just getting a blank check, the legislation makes $250 billion available immediately, then requires the President to certify that additional funds are needed. The Treasury must report on the use of the funds and on progress in addressing the crisis. The bill establishes an Oversight Board so that the Treasury cannot act in an arbitrary manner and establishes a special inspector general to protect against waste, fraud and abuse.

The United States is in a financial crisis that could become worse than anything in a generation. In addition, our Nation's problems are already spreading into the global economy. If the federal government fails to take action right now, there is a real threat to small businesses and jobs, as well as mortgages, pensions and savings.

For all these reasons, I concluded that Congress must act now, and I decided to vote in favor of H.R. 1424. In the last two weeks, I have worked hard to be sure that this bill includes provisions to help families who are struggling. I've closely questioned and sent two detailed letters to Treasury Secretary Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke and also spoke to leading economists about this legislation.

Enactment of this legislation is only the first in a series of steps we must take to bring about economic recovery. We need to institute rigorous and aggressive regulation of players in the market place in order to prevent the abuses which caused our economic problems.

Again, thank you for sharing your thoughts with me. Please do not hesitate to contact me in the future about this or any other matter of importance to you.

If you have access to the Internet, I encourage you to visit my web site, http://casey.senate.gov. I invite you to use this online office as a comprehensive resource to stay up-to-date on my work in Washington, request assistance from my office or share

Bob Casey

Thursday, October 2, 2008

Sen. Specter writes about the "Bail Out"

The following was received from Senator Arlen Specter in response to an e-mail communication from our publisher. Although a form letter, it is informative.

We can find no mention of any requirement that security acquisitions be at current market price. This is cause for considerable concern, since tax payers may well end up absorbing most or all of the losses, and the investors will lose little if anything.

The Editor



Thank you for contacting my office regarding the financial rescue legislation. I appreciate your views on this matter.

I reluctantly supported this package because the failure of Congress to act would run the risk of dire consequences, including an economic downturn which could cause more foreclosures, jeopardize retirement accounts, and further restrict credit which is necessary for small businesses to operate. I am philosophically opposed to bailouts. I think that when you have Wall Street entrepreneurs who take big risks to make big profits and they go sour, they ought to sustain the loss themselves and not look to the government for a bailout which ends up in the laps of the taxpayers. However, I supported the plan to avoid economic disaster that would extend well beyond Wall Street.

From the outset, I cautioned against Congress's rushing to judgment. When the initial proposal was made in mid-September, I wrote to Majority Leader Harry Reid and Republican Leader Mitch McConnell by letter dated September 21, 2008 urging we take the time necessary to get the legislation right. By letter dated September 23, 2008, I wrote to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke asking a series of questions which have not yet been answered. Then by letter dated September 27, 2008, accompanied by a Senate floor statement, I made a series of suggestions to the executive and legislative negotiators. Again, there has been insufficient time for a reply. Copies of these letters are available on my website: http://specter.senate.gov.

Whenever we deviate from regular order which has been developed during more than 200 years of serving our country very well, we are on thin ice. On regular order, the legislative process customarily begins with a bill which members of Congress can study and analyze. After the legislation is in hand, there are hearings with proponents and opponents of the bill and an opportunity for members to examine, really cross examine, to get to the heart of the issues and alternatives. Regular order calls for a markup in the committee of jurisdiction going over the language line by line with an opportunity to make changes with votes on those proposed modifications. Then the committee files a report which is reviewed by members in advance of floor action where amendments can be offered and debate occurs. The action by each house is then subjected to further refinement by a conference committee which makes the presentment to the President for yet another line of review. The process used to finalize this legislation drastically shortcut regular order.

The legislation passed by the Senate is enormously improved over the first Paulson proposal. The $700 billion is not to be authorized immediately, but instead there are installments of $250 billion, $100 billion at the request of the president and $350 billion more subject to congressional objection, although the latter phase may be unconstitutional under INS v. Chadha, which requires following regular legislative process with passage by both houses and Presidential approval to overrule Presidential action and perhaps inferentially legislative conditions. For protection of the taxpayers, the proposal contains a provision that if the government does not regain its money after five years, the President would be required to submit a plan for compensating the Treasury "from entities benefiting from the programs." While that provision is a far way from a guarantee or even assurances that such recovery legislation would be enacted, it gives some important comfort to the taxpayers' position.

There are provisions for multiple layers of oversight including a Financial Stability Oversight Board that will meet monthly to oversee the program. The Treasury Secretary will be required to report to Congress on a regular basis on the actions taken, along with a detailed financial statement. These reports will include information on each of the agreements made, insurance contracts entered into, and the nature of the asset purchased and projected costs and liabilities. Additional oversight will be provided by the Comptroller General (reports to Congress), a new Inspector General (audits and quarterly reports), a congressionally-appointed oversight panel (market and regulatory review, and reports to Congress on the program and the effectiveness of foreclosure mitigation efforts), and by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (cost estimates). A report will be required from the Secretary of the Treasury with an analysis of the current financial regulatory framework and recommendations for improvements.

There are substantial limitations on having benefits for entities which created the problem and limitations on executive pay. In cases where financial institutions sell troubled assets directly to the government with no competitive bidding and where the government receives a meaningful equity position, the legislation states that, until that equity stake is sold, executives would not get incentives "to take unnecessary and excessive risks" and would have to give up or repay bonuses or other incentives based on financial statements that "are later proven to be materially inaccurate." The bill also would prohibit "any golden parachute payment to senior executives."

The legislation is less stringent in provisions for financial institutions that sell their assets to the government through an auction. Such provisions would apply only to companies that sell more than $300 million in assets and would subject companies and employees to extra taxes. Corporations would not be able to deduct any salary or deferred compensation of more than $500,000, and top executives would face a 20% excise tax on golden parachute payments if they left for any reason other than retirement. In evaluating limitations on executive salaries, it is relevant to note that the Institute for Public Studies found that chief executives of large U.S. companies made an average of $10.5 million last year. That is more than 300 times the pay of the average worker.

The final proposal does provide for debt insurance, as advocated for by House Republicans, but leaves it to the Secretary of the Treasury to utilize that approach so it seems unlikely that it will be implemented in light of the fact that Secretary Paulson has bluntly stated his disagreement with it. Had there been floor amendments, Congress could have structured standards for utilization of debt insurance.

Had we followed regular order with an opportunity to propose amendments, consideration could have been given to my proposal, S.2133, which would have authorized the bankruptcy courts to restructure interest and scheduling of payments. The so-called variable rate mortgages have confronted many homeowners with the surprise that original payments, illustratively, of $1200 a month were soon raised to $2000 which resulted in defaults. Individualized examination by the bankruptcy courts might show misrepresentation or even fraud to justify revising the interest payments and rearranging the payment schedule. Or consideration could have been given to Senator Durbin's proposed legislation, S.2136, which would have authorized the bankruptcy courts to reset the principal balance depending on the value of the home. I opposed that bill because I thought it would discourage future lending, and in the long run raise the cost to homebuyers. But at least, following regular order, there would have been an opportunity to consider Senator Durbin's proposal as well as my suggested legislation.

The legislation contains authority for the Treasury Secretary to compensate foreign central banks under some conditions. It provides that troubled assets held by foreign financial authorities and banks are eligible for the Toxic Assets Recover Program (TARP) if the banks hold such assets as a result of having extended financing to financial institutions that have failed or defaulted. Had there been an opportunity for floor debate, that provision might have been sufficiently unpopular to be rejected or at least sharply circumscribed with conditions.

As a step to help keep borrowers in their homes, I proposed language found in Section 119 (b) of the bill to address the concern that some loan servicers have been reluctant to modify home mortgage loan terms because they fear litigation from investors who hold securities or other vehicles backed by the mortgage in question. The loan servicers have a legal duty to the investors to maximize the return on their investments. In testimony on December 6, 2007, before the House Committee on Financial Services, Mark Pearce, speaking on behalf of the conference of State Bank supervisors, discussed a meeting with the top 20 subprime servicers. He explained that "many of them brought up fear of investor lawsuits" as a hurdle to voluntary loan modification efforts. Because the rescue legislation encourages the government to seek voluntary loan modifications, it is important to remove any impediments to such modifications. To that end, the language provides a legal safe harbor for mortgage servicers making loan modifications, if the loan modifiers take reasonable mitigation steps, including accepting partial payments from homeowners.

On reforms to prevent a recurrence of this crisis, we need to question whether the rating agencies adequately analyzed mortgage-backed securities before issuing investment-grade ratings. These agencies appear to have failed. In July of 2007, when it became apparent that ratings issued by the big three rating agencies-Moody's, S&P and Fitch- could not be relied upon, I urged the relevant committees to look into the ratings that those agencies issued in recent years regarding mortgage-backed securities. Financial institutions that issue asset-backed securities obtain ratings for such securities. The failure to issue reliable ratings misrepresented the facts and fed the ability of financial institutions to tout the value of securities even though their value was declining. Congress and the regulators need to take up the rating agencies issue, and consider whether ratings agencies that have utterly failed to detect and reflect the risks associated with the securities they were rating should be accorded any reliance or role in our financial system. Some have suggested they should be regulated and we may need to consider that.

In addition, Congress and the regulators should review "off-balance sheet" transactions and leveraging. There should be a close examination on whether banks are sufficiently transparent and providing accurate accounting that truly reflects risk and leverage. Similarly there should be a review on Credit Default Swaps (CDS), which are privately traded derivatives contracts that have ballooned to make up what is a $2 trillion dollar market according to the Bank of International Settlements. They are a fast-growing major type of financial derivative. Many experts assert that they have played a critical role in this financial crisis as various financial players believed that they were safe because they thought CDS fully insured or protected them, but the CDS market is unregulated and no one really knows what exposure everyone else has from the CDS contracts. Consideration should be given to subjecting all over-the-counter derivatives onto a regulated exchange similar to that used by listed options in the equity markets.

Overleveraging has been a contributing factor in the turmoil that now threatens our financial institutions. We have seen a massive expansion of the practice of leveraged financial institutions (banks, investment banks, and hedge funds) making investments with borrowed money. In turn, they borrow more money by using the assets they just purchased as collateral. This sequence is continued again and again. The financial system, in its efforts to deleverage, is contracting credit. They must guard against future losses by holding more capital. Deleveraging is leading to difficulty on Main Street for individuals seeking to get a mortgage or buy a car. If a financial institution is able to unload its toxic assets onto the government, it will again be able to resume its lending activities that are crucial for economic growth in the United States. Unfortunately, much of the financial crisis has arisen from miscalculations of the risks involved with purchasing large amounts of securities backed by subprime mortgages and other toxic assets. We now see a situation where we are not just talking about a handful of firms. This is a widespread problem that should be addressed by this package and in future reforms of our financial regulatory structure.

In addition, the package crafted by Senate leaders includes two notable changes from the version that was rejected by the House on Monday. It includes a tax package that was previously passed in the Senate by a vote of 93-2 on September 23, 2008, but has since been rejected by the House in a dispute over revenue offsets. It includes tax incentives for wind, solar, biomass, and other alternative energy technologies. It also includes critically important relief from the Alternative Minimum Tax, which threatens to raise the tax liability of over 22 million unintended filers in 2008 if no action is taken. Finally, the package includes a host of provisions that either expired in 2007 or are set to expire in 2008, including the research and development tax credit, rail line improvement incentives, and quicker restaurant and retail depreciation schedules. I supported the Senate-passed tax extenders bill because it struck a responsible balance on the issue of revenue raising offsets.

The package also includes a provision to temporarily increase the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance limit to $250,000. Currently, the FDIC provides deposit insurance which guarantees the safety of checking and savings deposits in member banks, up to $100,000 per depositor per bank. Member banks pay a fee to participate. The current $100,000 limit has been unchanged since 1980 despite inflation. This approach is supported by both Senator McCain and Senator Obama, by House Republicans, and by the FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair. Raising the cap could stem a potential run on deposits by bank customers, particularly businesses, who fear losing their money. Such fears contributed to the collapse of Washington Mutual and Wachovia Bank.

Congress has been called upon to make the best of a very bad situation. Careful oversight of the authority given to the Treasury Department will need to be undertaken, and a review of our regulatory structure will be necessary as we move forward.

Again, thank you for writing. The concerns of my constituents are of great importance to me, and I rely on you and other Pennsylvanians to inform me of your views. If you require assistance with a federal agency, please contact my state office in your area. The contact information can be found on my website at specter.senate.gov.

Arlen Specter

New Era's editorial ridiculous

Excellent commentary re: the New Era's ridiculously over the top editorial supporting a bail out.

It's hard to comprehend how a supposedly conservative leaning paper can stand shoulder to shoulder with Barney Frank and Nancy Pelosi and aggressively endorse their position. This while a local legislator, Rep Joe Pitts, votes against the plan. Crazy!

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

TRRAAC consulting with attorney

I would like to make sure you understand TRRAAC's position in regard to legal counsel. We have been in consultation with an attorney since early June 2008. Specifically, we are addressing what appear to be our only viable legal avenues - environmental issues. We have made significant progress.

Because this project involves the rail road, we are have been advised that there are no other viable legal options...

We would welcome any helpful suggestions you can provide. Meanwhile, we will continue to pursue the environmental legalities